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Image, and Force 
Richard  Moran 
One  way in which  the  characteristic  gestures  of  philosophy  and  criti- 
cism differ  from  each  other  lies in their  involvements  with disillusion- 
ment,  with  the  undoing  of  our  naivete,  especially  regarding  what  we 
take ourselves  to know about  the  meaning  of what we say. Philosophy 
will often  find  less than  we thought  was there,  perhaps  nothing  at all, 
in  what  we  say about  the  "external"  world,  or  in  our judgments  of 
value,  or in our ordinary  psychological  talk. The  work of criticism,  on 
the  other  hand,  frequently  disillusions  by finding  disturbingly  more  in 
what is said than we precritically  thought  was there.  In our relation  to 
the meaningfulness  of what we say, there  is a disillusionment  of plenti- 
tude as well as of emptiness.  And no doubt  what is "less" for one  disci- 
pline  may be "more"  of what someone  else is looking  for. 
In  recent  years,  metaphor  has  attracted  more  than  its  share  of 
both  philosophical  and critical attention,  including  philosophical  deni- 
als of  the  obvious,  as well  as critical  challenges  to  the  obviousness  of 
the  ways we talk about  metaphor.  In this paper  I discuss a problem  of 
each  sort and suggest  a complex  of  relations  between  them.  The  par- 
ticular denial of the obvious  that I'm interested  in is the claim recently 
made  by  Donald  Davidson  that  "a metaphor  doesn't  say anything  be- 
yond  its literal  meaning  (nor does  its maker  say anything,  in using  the 
metaphor,  beyond  the literal),"  nor is it even  correct  to speak of meta- 
phor  as  a  form  of  communication.'  There's  disillusionment  with  a 
1.  Donald  Davidson,  "What  Metaphors  Mean,"  in  On Metaphor, ed.  Sheldon 
Sacks  (Chicago,  1979),  p.  30;  hereafter  abbreviated  "WMM."  Davidson's  view  has 
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vengeance;  and even  if not  strictly believable,  it is still not  without  its 
therapeutic  value, as we shall see. 
Rather  than  being  deflationary,  the  critical  or  interpretive  ques- 
tion  I want to take up means  to make a problem  of two common  ways 
of  talking  about  metaphor.  Both  philosophers  and  literary  critics  call 
metaphor  a figurative use of language.  So perhaps  it should  not be sur- 
prising  that  discussions  of  metaphor  so often  refer  to  its imagistic  or 
picturing  dimension  as being  central  to  a metaphor's  power.  In a re- 
cent book  on conceptions  of the differences  between  images  and texts, 
W. J.  T.  Mitchell  mentions  the  problem  of  the  position  of  metaphor 
within this difference: 
Literal  language  is  generally  understood  (by  literary  critics)  as 
straight,  unadorned,  unpicturesque  expression,  free  of  verbal 
images  and  figures  of  speech.  Figurative  language,  on  the  other 
hand,  is what  we  ordinarily  mean  when  we  talk about  verbal  im- 
agery.  [Here  he  cites  the  second  entry  for  "verbal  imagery"  in 
The Princeton Encyclopedia  of Poetry and Poetics.] The  phrase,  "ver- 
bal imagery,"  in other  words,  seems  to  be  a metaphor  for  meta- 
phor  itself!2 
And  even  if other  tropes  are  often  called  figures,  it is through  their 
association  with metaphor  that they  get  this name.  Among  tropes,  it is 
metaphor  that  is continually  and  insistently  thought  of  as providing  a 
kind of picture,  such as a verbal  icon,  or a physiognomy  of  discourse. 
The  reasons for this are anything  but clear,  for the association  persists 
long  after  images  have  lost the  place  they  once  had in accounting  for 
the  rest of  language  and thought.  The  second  part of  the  interpretive 
problem  concerns  the  equally  venerable  and no  less problematic  asso- 
ciation  of metaphor  with force  and compelling  power.  What is the  na- 
ture  of  the  "force"  of  metaphor,  and  what  is it supposed  to  compel? 
In contrast  to nonfigurative  language,  it's often  difficult  to distinguish 
found  supporters  among  both  philosophers  and literary theorists.  It is, for example,  im- 
portant  to the early argument  of Richard  Rorty's recent  book.  See his Contingency,  Irony, 
and Solidarity (Cambridge,  1989),  p.  18. 
2.  W. J.  T.  Mitchell,  Iconology:  Image, Text, Ideology (Chicago,  1986),  p.  21.  Al- 
though  the  relation  between  image  and  metaphor  is not  pursued  further  in this  work, 
Mitchell  usefully  goes  on here  to distinguish  the  sense  of figurative  language  as picture- 
like  from  the  picturing  dimension  often  claimed  for  nonfigurative  language,  for  exam- 
ple,  the  picturing  relation  between  a proposition  and the  state of affairs that  it depicts, 
as presented  in Ludwig Wittgenstein's  Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. 
Richard  Moran  is an assistant professor  of  philosophy  at  Prince- 
ton  University.  He  is currently  working  on  a book  on  subjectivity  and 
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what  is meant  by the  "force"  and  the  "meaning"  of  metaphor,  espe- 
cially when,  in pursuit  of clarification  about  meaning,  we are referred 
to  something  imagistic.  Meaning,  image,  and  force  can  form  a  tight 
circle  here,  each  concept  leaning  upon  the  others.  Expanding  this 
circle  a  bit  will  be  helped  by  taking  Davidson's  denial  of  figurative 
meaning  seriously,  even  if not,  in the end,  taking it quite literally. 
Image and Force 
The  association  of  metaphor  with  images  has  several  sources, 
many  of  which  are  familiar  enough  to  require  only  brief  mention 
here.3 The  metaphorical  relation  between  two things  is typically taken 
to  be  based  on  some  unobvious  resemblance  between  them,  or  to  be 
actually  productive  of  such  a  resemblance.4  Sometimes  metaphor  is 
regarded  as itself a kind of composite  picture,  the result of two images 
being  fused  together.  The  understanding  of  a  metaphor  is taken  to 
involve  seeing one  thing  as another,  and  discussions  of  metaphor  will 
often  allude to Ludwig  Wittgenstein's  notion  of "seeing  an aspect." 
3.  The  association  of  metaphor  with  images  or  pictures  has  a  long  history  in 
philosophical  theorizing  on  the  subject.  Aristotle  speaks  of  metaphor  as putting  some- 
thing  before  the  eyes  of  the  audience,  or  "making  your  hearers  see things"  (Rhetoric, 
3.1411b22-29,  trans.  W. Rhys Roberts,  vol.  11 of  The Works  of Aristotle, ed.  W. D.  Ross 
[Oxford,  1924]).  In his Aesthetics,  G. W. F. Hegel  relates  metaphor  and the  image  [Bild], 
that  is, the verbal image.  See Aesthetics:  Lectures on Fine Art, trans.  T.  M. Knox  (Oxford, 
1975),  pp. 404-10.  This  is part of a still-popular  tradition  of conceiving  of metaphor  as 
a  sensuous  or  concrete  representation  for  something  that  is  nonsensuous  or  abstract. 
Belonging  to  this  tradition  as  well  is  Friedrich  Nietzsche's  comparison  of  truths  and 
their  concepts  with  "metaphors  which  are  worn  out  and  without  sensuous  power 
[sinnlich kraftlos]; coins  which  have  lost  their  pictures  [Bild]."  See  his  "Uber  Wahrheit 
und  Liige  im aussermoralischen  Sinn,"  Werke  in Drei Bainden, ed.  Karl Schlechta  (Mun- 
ich,  1966),  3:309-22,  for  this  and  further  remarks  on  metaphor  and  pictures.  An  ex- 
tract  of  this  is  translated  and  published  as  "On  Truth  and  Lie  in  an  Extra-Moral 
Sense,"  The Portable Nietzsche, trans.  and  ed.  Walter  Kaufmann  (New  York,  1954),  pp. 
42-47.  In his theory  of signs, C. S. Peirce  classifies metaphor  with the  icon,  which  is his 
category  of signs, such as images,  which are based on resemblance  between  the sign and 
the  thing  signified.  See  "Logic  as Semiotic:  The  Theory  of  Signs," Philosophical Writings 
of Peirce, ed. Justus  Buchler  (New  York,  1955),  p.  105.  The  association  offorce  and  im- 
age,  the greater  force  of images  relative  to words, has its own history  too,  which  I won't 
be able to explore  here.  Roland  Barthes alludes to it in distinguishing  between  the  form 
of  the  sign  and  its particular  substance  (for  example,  pictorial  or  written):  "This  sub- 
stance  is not  unimportant:  pictures,  to  be  sure,  are more  imperative  than  writing,  they 
impose  meaning  at  one  stroke,  without  analysing  or  diluting  it"  (Barthes,  Mythologies, 
trans.  Annette  Lavers [New  York,  1972],  p.  110).  The  idea  of  the  greater  "imperativi- 
ty" of pictures  over that of words deserves  a separate  study itself. 
4.  See  Max  Black,  "Metaphor,"  Models and  Metaphors: Studies in  Language and 
Philosophy (Ithaca,  N.  Y.,  1962),  p.  37,  and  Nelson  Goodman,  Languages of Art: An Ap- 
proach to a Theory  of Symbols  (Indianapolis,  1968),  p. 78. 
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Among  recent  writers,  Paul  Ricoeur  has  insisted  on  a  "constitu- 
tive"  role  for  images  (and  imagination)  in  any  account  of  metaphor, 
whether  a psychological  account  or  one  that  concentrates  on  the  se- 
mantic  content  of  the  metaphorical  assertion.  By  way of  introducing 
this claim, he says: 
The  very expression  "figure  of  speech"  implies  that in metaphor, 
as in the  other  tropes  or turns,  discourse  assumes  the  nature  of  a 
body by displaying  forms and traits which  usually characterize  the 
human  face,  man's "figure";  it is as though  the  tropes  gave to dis- 
course  a quasi-bodily  externalization.  By providing  a kind  of  fig- 
urability to the message,  the tropes  make discourse  appear. 
And  he  cites  Tzvetan  Todorov  as defining  "figure"  as "the  visibility 
of  discourse."5  We  can  see  that  already  a  certain  ambiguity  has 
emerged  in the allusions  to image  and vision.  For at first we were con- 
cerned  with  a kind  of  imagistic  relation  of  resemblance  between  two 
things; for  example,  a person  and  a wet  blanket.  And  Ricoeur  is con- 
cerned  with  this  as  well  in  the  article  cited.  In  the  passage  quoted, 
however,  what is said to  appear  and is likened  to  a human  face  is the 
discourse  itself,  the utterance  or the words. 
One  motivation  for  insisting  on  seeing  or  on  some  experiential 
aspect  to  understanding  metaphor  is  a  sense  of  the  inadequacy,  or 
worse,  of  the  pat  paraphrases  that  are  so  often  proposed  in  theories 
that  take  metaphor  to  be  an  indirect  statement  of  resemblance.  To 
call someone  a tail-wagging  lapdog  of  privilege  is not  simply  to  make 
an  assertion  of  his  enthusiastic  submissiveness.  Even  a pat  metaphor 
deserves  better  than  this,  and  such  an  analysis  is  not  essentially  im- 
proved  by tacking on an open-ended  list of further  dog-predicates  that 
may possibly be part of the metaphor's  meaning.  Hence  it becomes  at- 
tractive at this point  to insist that the  comprehension  of  the metaphor 
involves  seeing this person  as a lapdog,  and  in some  detail,  experienc- 
ing his dogginess.  This is what a successful  metaphor  pulls off,  and this 
image-making  quality  is what  lies  behind  both  the  force  and  the  un- 
paraphrasability of poetic  metaphor. 
Talk  about  the  force  or  compelling  power  of  metaphor  is often 
bound  up with  reference  to  its imagistic  capacity.  Part of  the  danger- 
ous power  of a strong  metaphor  is its control  over  one's  thinking  at a 
level  beneath  that  of  deliberation  or  volition.  In  the  mind  of  the 
hearer  an image  is produced  that  is not  chosen  or  willed.  The  meta- 
phorical  assertion  brings  one  to  see  something  familiar  through this 
5.  Paul  Ricoeur,  "The  Metaphorical  Process  as  Cognition,  Imagination,  and 
Feeling,"  in On Metaphor, p.  142.  There  is also  some  discussion  of  the  role  of  images, 
the  iconic,  and  "seeing  as" in his book,  The Rule of Metaphor:  Multi-disciplinary  Studies of 
the Creation  of Meaning in Language, trans. Robert  Czerny (Toronto,  1977),  pp.  187-215. 
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image,  framed  by it, and this "seeing"  persists concurrently  with one's 
original  sense of the dissimilarity of the two things  here  being  brought 
together.  And  the  full appreciative  comprehension  of  a metaphor  can 
make any subsequent  denial of the point  it makes seem feeble  or disin- 
genuous,  in much  the  same  way that  appreciative  understanding  of  a 
joke  can  overpower  any  subsequent  refusal  of  the  point  it makes.  If 
someone  is  described  as  having  all  the  charm  of  a  damp  kitchen 
sponge,  it's no good  simply to deny it, after  he or she has registered  an 
appreciation  of  the  phrase.  In  an  article  comparing  metaphor  and 
jokes,  and  the  ways speaker  and  hearer  are  "drawn closer  to  one  an- 
other,"  Ted  Cohen  says, "When  the  device  is a hostile  metaphor  or a 
cruel joke  requiring  much  background  and effort  to  understand,  it is 
all the more painful because  the victim has been  made a complicitor  in 
his  own  demise."6  But  what  is  special  about  this  speech  situation  is 
that  no  one,  I think,  would  speak  of  an ordinary  literal  insult  in  this 
way. Understanding  here  does  not bring any special complicity  with it, 
not  with  the  assertion  nor  with  its  intent.  "Getting  the  point"  here 
does  not interfere  with denying  or repulsing  it. Nonetheless,  Cohen  is 
surely  on  to  something.  Metaphor  does  appear  to  have  a  force  that 
goes  beyond  agreement  with what it asserts. Wayne  Booth  is respond- 
ing to the same sense in the following  passage: 
Part of  what  is communicated  does  not  depend  on  the  metaphor 
succeeding  in the  sense  of  winning  or  even  in  the  sense  of  being 
thought  good.  The  speaker  has performed  a task by yoking  what 
the  hearer  had  not  yoked  before,  and  the  hearer  simply  cannot 
resist joining  him; they  thus perform  an identical  dance  step,  and 
the  metaphor  accomplishes  at  least  part  of  its  work  even  if  the 
hearer  then  draws  back  and  says,  "I  shouldn't  have  allowed 
that!"7 
What  is the  compulsion  here,  what  is it that  the  hearer  cannot  resist 
joining  in,  and  what  is  the  nature  of  his  or  her  complicity?  (Later, 
Booth  characterizes  understanding  a metaphor  as deciding  "either  to 
be  shaped  in  the  shape  his  metaphor  requires  or  to  resist.")8 It  is al- 
most  as  if  the  imagistic  "seeing"  of  metaphor  comprehension  really 
involved  one's  seeing things  that way, that is, believing  them  to be that 
way, which  would  give  us no  way to  distinguish  between  understand- 
ing  a  metaphorical  assertion  and  believing  it.  A  powerful  trope  in- 
deed. 
6.  Ted  Cohen,  "Metaphor  and  the  Cultivation  of  Intimacy,"  in On Metaphor, p. 
10. 
7.  Wayne  Booth,  "Metaphor  as  Rhetoric:  The  Problem  of  Evaluation,"  in  On 
Metaphor, p. 52. 
8.  Ibid., p. 63. 92  Richard Moran  Metaphor,  Image, and Force 
This  alone  should  make us suspicious  of the  idea of force  in meta- 
phor.  For there  is no  category  of  utterances  that  necessarily  produce, 
when  understood,  agreement  or  belief  in what  they  assert,  any  more 
than  an  utterance  can  automatically  produce  understanding  of  its 
meaning.  But  if neither  in belief  nor  in meaning,  then  where  are  we 
to  locate  the  power  of  metaphor  so  often  praised  and  blamed? 
"Force"  is a  notoriously  equivocal  word,  especially  when  applied  to 
discourse;  still,  it  seems  clear  enough  that  the  metaphorical  force  in 
question  can be  neither  that of  assent  to  nor understanding  of  the  as- 
sertion,  nor J.  L.  Austin's  "illocutionary  force"  (the  metaphorical  ut- 
terance  is not  itself  the  accomplishment  of  any  social  act,  aside  from 
the bare illocution  of calling  or saying), nor the  cogent  force  of a con- 
vincing  argument.  This  is not  to  say that  any or  all of  these  types  of 
force  can't  apply  to  this  or  that  metaphorical  utterance.  Performa- 
tives,  for  instance,  can  themselves  be  couched  in  metaphor.  But  the 
power  we hear about  in connection  with metaphor,  which  the  "hearer 
simply  cannot  resist,"  is supposed  to  be  something  peculiar  to  meta- 
phor,  and perhaps  other  figurative  language.  It ought,  then,  to be re- 
lated  in some  way to  the  content  of  a metaphorical  assertion,  to  what 
it says, and  should  not  turn  out  to  be  something  that  applies  equally 
well to any and every other  use of language. 
A  similar  point  applies  to  the  association  of  metaphor  with  im- 
ages.  That  is, there  ought  to  be  some  special  reason  for  the  meaning 
of  metaphor  to  be  couched  in  imagistic  terms,  a reason  that  doesn't 
apply  as well  or  as poorly  to  other  speech.  There  is no  one  today,  I 
think,  who  would  identify  understanding  the  meaning  of  a word  with 
the  having  of  a  mental  image  (or  "idea"),  though  this  and  related 
ideas  did  dominate  thinking  about  language  for  some  time.  Is meta- 
phor,  then,  taken to be a case of language-use  for which  such a proto- 
theory  is  actually  true,  where,  in  Wittgenstein's  chiding  phrase, 
"uttering  a word  is like striking  a note  on  the  keyboard  of  the  imagi- 
nation"?9 There's  no need  to deny  that uttering  a metaphor  may give 
rise  to  a play of  images  in  the  mind  of  the  hearer;  however,  there  is 
no reason  to think that it must always be so, or that this is what consti- 
tutes  the  full  understanding  of  a  metaphor.  Nor  is  it  only  strictly 
visual  images  that  are  inessential  to  the  figurative.  For  example, 
there's  no morsel  for the mind's eye,  ear, nose,  or throat  in Theseus's 
figurative  saying  that  the  poet's  pen  "gives  to  aery  nothing  /  A  local 
habitation  and a name." 
There  are still deeper  problems  with  thinking  of  the  meaning  of 
metaphor  in  terms  of  images,  problems  internal  to  the  nature  of  an 
image.  For  a metaphor  is semantically  articulate  in  a way that  a pic- 
9.  Wittgenstein,  Philosophical Investigations, trans.,  G.  E.  M.  Anscombe  (Oxford 
and New  York,  1953),  sect. 6. Critical Inquiry  Autumn 1989 
ture is not; it has parts that perform  different  functions.  In many met- 
aphors both  terms interact  with each other,  altering  our experience  of 
both  items of the  comparison.  There  are many other  metaphors,  how- 
ever,  that  work  in one  direction  only,  and  are  not  reversible  without 
change  of meaning.  For example,  when  we read in Wordsworth  "Thy 
soul was like a Star, and dwelt  apart,"  our apprehension  of both  souls 
and  stars is affected,  each  taking  on  aspects  of  the  other.  But,  on  the 
other  hand, the floral and culinary stock in trade of erotic  metaphor  is 
rarely  reversible.  If we  are  enjoined  to  imagine  a garden  in her  face 
or  lips  like  cherries,  we  may be  sure  we  are  not  to  read  against  the 
grain  in  the  direction  of  a face  in  the  garden  or  cherries  like  lips.10 
This  is why  so many  analyses  of  metaphor  contain  at least  two  terms 
for  its functioning  parts (I. A.  Richards's  "tenor"  and  "vehicle,"  Max 
Black's  "frame"  and  "focus,"  and  so  on).  An  image,  a  real  image, 
can't tell us what is being  imagined  as what; and yet,  there  is a differ- 
ence  between  seeing  oak  leaves  as  hands  and  seeing  hands  as  oak 
leaves.1  An  image  could  provide  you  with  nothing  more  than  a kind 
of  composite  picture  in  which  you  could  discern  features  of  each  of 
them.  This,  I  believe,  shows  what  is misguided  about  any  theory  of 
metaphor  as based  on  the  psychoanalytic  mechanism  of  condensation, 
which  is said to  function  like  a composite  photograph.'2  It also forces 
us to rethink  the  role  of resemblance  in metaphor  (and in simile,  too, 
for  that matter).  For resemblance  and similarity are both  symmetrical 
relations:  if  A  resembles  B,  then  B resembles  A.  Hence,  if metaphor 
were  some  kind of  assertion  of  resemblance,  we  should  be  able  to  re- 
verse any of the parts without  loss or change  of meaning. 
10.  William Gass has some  remarks on this in his On Being Blue: A Philosophical In- 
quiry (Boston,  1975),  pp.  39-40.  Black  notes  the  irreversibility  of  certain  similes  in 
"How  Metaphors  Work: A Reply to Donald  Davidson,"  in On Metaphor, p.  186 n.23. 
11.  This  difference  in  meaning  is  not  dependent  on  the  context  being  one  of 
predication,  but it will obtain  even  in the  case of  "mere"  verbal juxtaposition.  Even the 
imagists didn't  get to images: the petals on a wet black bough  are not themselves  seen as 
faces in a crowd.  The  criticism of the  appeal to images  was one  of I. A. Richards's origi- 
nal motivations  for  introducing  the  terminology  of  "tenor"  and  "vehicle."  See  his Phi- 
losophy  of Rhetoric  (Oxford,  1936),  pp. 98-99. 
12.  Freud  frequently  compares  the  mechanism  of condensation  in dream-work  to 
the composite  photographs  of faces produced  by Francis Galton.  See The Interpretation  of 
Dreams, The Standard Edition of the Complete  Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. 
and ed. James  Strachey,  24 vols. (London,  1953-74),  4:139,  293,  and 5:494. 
This  is also one  thing  that discourages  thinking  of caricatures  and the  like as "vis- 
ual metaphors"  (see  Goodman,  Languages of Art, pp.  84,  89).  Even though  not  all meta- 
phors  are  "one-way,"  the  possibility  of  drawing  the  distinction  in  direction  seems 
internal  to  metaphor  but  not  to  pictures.  Context,  of  course,  will normally  leave  us in 
no  doubt  as  to  whether  some  picture  is  that  of  Churchill-as-bulldog  or  bulldog-as- 
Churchill. 
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Finally, the  appeal  to images  gives  us an especially  bad model  for 
accounting  for  the  endlessness  of  the  paraphrase  or  elaboration  of  a 
living  metaphor.  This  endlessness  is a familiar fact about  poetic  meta- 
phor,  and  may  even  itself  contribute  to  the  association  with  images, 
via the  notion  that it is a picture that  is worth  a thousand  interpretive 
words  in  such  a  case.  But  what  kind  of  picture  would  we  get  if  we 
tried  to  visualize  the  various  parts of  the  manifold  of  paraphrase  and 
pack them  into  a single  image? Stanley  Cavell provides  a sample  gloss 
on  the  phrase  "Juliet is the  sun,"  in the  course  of  which  he  says that 
"Romeo  means  that Juliet  is the  warmth of  his world; that his day be- 
gins with her; that only in her nourishment  can he grow.  And  his dec- 
laration  suggests  that the  moon,  which  other  lovers use as emblems  of 
their  love,  is merely  her  reflected  light,  and dead  in comparison;  and 
so on."13 Of the items mentioned  here,  even  the ones  that do relate  to 
something  visual can't  all be  combined  into  a single  image.  The  fur- 
ther we go on with the gloss,  including  the dawn, growth  and nourish- 
ment,  the  moon,  the  planets,  the  changing  seasons,  and  so  on,  the 
more  absurd becomes  the  attempt  to see all this as contained  in some- 
thing  identifiable  as an image.  And  yet  part of  the  original  attraction 
of  the  "image"  idea  was the  unifying  or  organizing  function  claimed 
for an image; yet,  in fact, you just  don't  get  anything  like a picture  by 
putting  all these  things  together.  And a concessionary  appeal to several 
images at this point  fails to explain  or justify  any recourse  to images  in 
the first place. 
Davidson's Choice 
Much  of  what  I've  said about  images  so  far  has been  predicated 
on  the assumption  that metaphors  do mean  something,  or rather,  that 
speakers  mean  things  by  them,  use  them  to  say something  or  other. 
However,  if this is wrong  then  my objections  based  on  considerations 
of  paraphrase,  on  change  of  meaning  when  the  terms  are  reversed, 
and  so  on  will  not  apply.  If  one  denies  that  the  metaphor-speaker  is 
involved  in saying anything  distinct  from  what  his or  her  words  liter- 
ally mean,  then  perhaps  the  way is open  to  seeing  metaphor  as func- 
tioning  like  a picture  after  all,  with  "force"  applying  to  it  only  as it 
may to a picture,  which  doesn't  literally  say anything.  And  in making 
just  this denial,  Davidson  does  make passing comparison  of metaphors 
and pictures: 
13.  Stanley  Cavell,  "Aesthetic  Problems  of  Modern  Philosophy,"  Must We Mean 
What We Say?  A Book  of Essays (1969;  Cambridge,  1976),  pp. 78-79. 
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What  I deny  is that  metaphor  does  its  work  by  having  a special 
meaning,  a specific  cognitive  content....  -to  suppose  it can be 
effective  only  by  conveying  a  coded  message  is  like  thinking  a 
joke  or a dream  makes some  statement  which  a clever  interpreter 
can restate  in plain prose. Joke  or dream  or metaphor  can,  like a 
picture  or  a bump  on  the  head,  make  us appreciate  some  fact- 
but not by standing  for, or expressing,  the  fact. ["WMM," p. 44]14 
The  main focus  of  Davidson's  attack is the  idea of metaphor-meaning, 
as mentioned  above.  The  literal meaning  of  the  words or phrase  is all 
the meaning  there  is in such a case. Yet he warns against taking this to 
be  merely  a terminological  issue,  "an insistence  on  restraint  in using 
the word 'meaning'": 
This  would  be  wrong.  The  central  error  about  metaphor  is most 
easily attacked  when  it takes the  form  of a theory  of metaphorical 
meaning,  but  behind  that  theory,  and  statable  independently,  is 
the  thesis  that  associated  with  a metaphor  is a cognitive  content 
that  its  author  wishes  to  convey  and  that  the  interpreter  must 
grasp if he is to get the message.  ["WMM," p. 44] 
Hence,  the use of metaphor  has certain  effects  on the  hearer,  but these 
do  not  constitute  the  meaning of  the  metaphor;  and  even  if  among 
these  effects  is that  the  hearer  comes  to  notice  or  realize  something, 
this  is  not  something  the  speaker  has  said or  intended  to  communi- 
cate. 
The  sense  of  "meaning"  that  Davidson  has in mind  is strictly that 
of  meaning-in-a-language,  and  not  what  is  sometimes  distinguished 
from  this as "speaker-meaning."  This  is somewhat  disappointing  both 
because  writers who refer  to metaphor-meaning  have not claimed  that 
a  single  metaphorical  utterance  somehow  permanently  alters  the 
dictionary-meaning  of  a word,15 and  also  because  the  distinction  be- 
tween  word-meaning  and  speaker-meaning  forms  the  basis of  at least 
one  influential  account  of  metaphor.16 And  along  with  an implicit  re- 
striction  on  the  word  "meaning,"  Davidson  assumes  a sense  of  meta- 
14.  See  "WMM,"  p.  45  for  more  on  pictures.  Rorty  (Contingency,  Irony, and Soli- 
darity, p.  18) also mentions  pictures  in his sketch  of  Davidson's  account.  I do  not  mean 
to suggest  that the  vindication  of any "imagistic"  account  of metaphor  is itself a motiva- 
tion for what either  of them  say. 
15.  See Black, "How  Metaphors  Work," p.  187. 
16.  See John  R. Searle,  "Metaphor,"  Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory 
of Speech Acts (Cambridge,  1979),  pp.  76-116.  It would  also be  useful  to  know  whether 
Davidson  would  deny  that  Gricean  implicature  is a way  of  communicating  something 
distinct  from  what one's  words literally  mean.  H.  P. Grice briefly  discusses  metaphor  in 
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phor  itself  that  is somewhat  narrower  than  that  of  other  writers  on 
the  subject.  Although  this restriction  is partially buried  in his essay, it 
comes  out  in  some  remarks  he  makes  at  the  beginning,  as well  as in 
his  treatment  of  the  difference  between  the  living  and  the  dead 
among  metaphors. 
Early on  Davidson  says, somewhat  surprisingly,  "A  metaphor  im- 
plies  a kind  and  degree  of  artistic  success;  there  are  no  unsuccessful 
metaphors,  just  as  there  are  no  unfunny  jokes.  There  are  tasteless 
metaphors,  but  these  are  turns  that  nevertheless  have  brought  some- 
thing  off,  even  if  it were  not  worth  bringing  off  or  could  have  been 
brought  off  better"  ("WMM," p.  29).  I think  he  is on  firmer  ground 
in the  case of  metaphor  than  with jokes.  It's hard to believe  that any- 
one  who  has dwelt  in an academic  environment  for  as long  as David- 
son  has would  think  that  he  had never  encountered  an unfunny joke. 
(Well, perhaps  he's only joking  here.  But what if we decide  that he is?) 
It's true that we do seem  to lack terms of criticism  for metaphors  that 
apply  prior  to  their  succeeding  in  bringing  us  to  see  something  in  a 
certain  way.  Prior  to  this  success  we  may  either  irrelevantly  criticize 
the  expression  as wildly false,  or simply confess  that we do not  under- 
stand it. But if some  such  success  is to  be definitional of  metaphor,  we 
must ask just  what it is that has been  "brought  off"  here.  This  should 
remind  us of Booth's  remark that "part of what is communicated  does 
not  depend  on  the  metaphor  succeeding  in  the  sense  of  winning  or 
even  in the  sense  of  being  thought  good.  The  speaker  has performed 
a  task  by  yoking  what  the  hearer  had  not  yoked  before,  and  the 
hearer  simply cannot  resist joining  him."  This  "yoking"  of  two  ideas, 
or the framing  of one  in terms of the other,  is, I think,  what Davidson 
has in mind  when  he  speaks of  something  being  "brought  off."  Part 
of  the  difference  between  Davidson  and  Booth  on  this  point  is that 
Booth  allows  himself  to  speak  of  "what  is communicated"  in  this  re- 
gard, which  Davidson,  of course,  will not do.  Also,  Booth  does  not ex- 
plicitly make success at such framing  true by definition  of anything  we 
can call a metaphor.  Yet this again is not without  its motivation.  For if 
no  ideas have been  linked  together,  if nothing  has been  seen  in terms 
of  something  else,  then  we just  have  a  statement  inexplicable  in  its 
gross falsity or in its banal irrelevant  truth.  So there  are no unsuccess- 
ful  metaphors,  but  what  they  succeed  at  is not  the  assertion  or  com- 
munication  of  anything  (for  example,  a  statement  of  resemblance). 
Their  success is at the  level  of effects, what they  get  us to associate,  or 
notice,  or attend  to. 
Accordingly,  this definition  of  metaphor  in terms  of  effects  leads 
Davidson  to  discount,  as  proposed  examples  of  metaphor,  turns  of 
this connection  in his "Logic  and  Conversation,"  in Speech Acts, vol.  3 of Syntax and Se- 
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speech  that don't  produce  such effects.  A dead  metaphor,  such as the 
"mouth"  of a river or a bottle,  no longer  draws attention  to itself,  nor 
does  it force  attention  to any covert  likeness  between  things.  What has 
happened,  according  to  Davidson,  is  that  the  field  of  application  of 
the  original  term  has been  expanded  to  include  bottles  and  rivers,  as 
now literally having  mouths.  However: 
When  "mouth"  applied  only  metaphorically  to bottles,  the  appli- 
cation  made the hearer notice a likeness between  animal and bottle 
openings.  (Consider  Homer's  reference  to  wounds  as  mouths.) 
Once  one  has the  present  use of  the  word,  with  literal application 
to bottles,  there  is nothing  left  to notice.  There  is no similarity to 
seek  because  it  consists  simply  in  being  referred  to  by  the  same 
word.  ["WMM," p. 35] 
And  there  is  no  survival  in  this  death  of  anything  to  be  called  the 
meaning  of the original  live metaphor. 
So Davidson  makes successful  achievement  of  the  effects  of  fram- 
ing or yoking  together  a requirement  of anything  to be called  a meta- 
phor.  And  this  requirement  operates  from  two  different  directions. 
There  are no  unsuccessful  metaphors,  in the  sense  of  metaphors  that 
fail to bring off such effects.  And there  are no dead metaphors,  that is, 
metaphors  that  once  had  such  effects  and  now  no  longer  do.  For  a 
dead  metaphor,  such as "river mouth,"  is not  a metaphor  at all, but a 
(relatively) new literal application  of the term  "mouth." 
Naturally  this  raises  a problem  for  describing  the  life  cycle  of  a 
metaphor.  We will have  to  say that  before  the  birth  of  the  metaphor, 
it was categorically  false, or meant  nothing,  to speak of the mouth  of a 
river.  And  then  after  the  metaphor's  death,  the  literal  meaning  or ap- 
plication  of  the  word  "mouth"  has been  changed  to  include  parts  of 
rivers.  Now  where  did  this new  meaning  come  from? The  natural  as- 
sumption  is that  it is part of  what was meant  when  the  metaphor  was 
alive,  that  it  survived  the  metaphor's  death  and  its  loss  of  imagistic 
force.  Davidson  cannot  say this  since,  for  him,  the  live  metaphor  had 
no  meaning  distinct  from  the  literal  falsehood  carried  by  the  phrase 
prior  to  the  metaphor's  existence.  All  that  was distinctive  about  the 
phrase during  its life as a metaphor  was on the level  of effects  of vivid- 
ness  and  force,  and  now  at its death  it has  lost  these.  And  yet  some- 
how  what  remains  is  a  phrase  with  a  posthumous  literal  meaning 
different  from its original  literal one.'7 
17.  Related  objections  to Davidson's  account  have been  made by Goodman  ("Met- 
aphor as Moonlighting,"  in On Metaphor, pp.  175-80),  and by David Novitz  ("Metaphor, 
Derrida,  and  Davidson,"  Journal  of  Aesthetics and  Art  Criticism 44  [Winter  1985]: 
101-14).  I will not be  canvassing  all of  the  merits  and problems  in Davidson's  account. 
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The  restriction  of  examples  of  true  metaphor  to  utterances  that 
succeed  at the  framing-effect  of live metaphor  is an option  that is also 
implicitly taken by other  writers on the subject.  Indeed,  there  is some- 
thing  of  an  unacknowledged  division  in  discussions  of  metaphor  be- 
tween  those  who believe  that only a live metaphor  is truly a metaphor, 
and  those  who  downplay  the  difference  between  the  living  and  the 
dead,  taking  what  is important  and  distinctive  about  metaphor  to  be 
independent  of  this difference.  Writers  who  fix  on  live  metaphor  will 
typically  also  emphasize  imagery  and  force  (or  various  nonassertoric 
"effects")  in their accounts  of what is distinctive  about  metaphor.  This 
is a rough  characterization,  but in varying degrees  it applies  to David- 
son,  Ricoeur,  C.  S.  Peirce,  and  aspects  of  the  work  of  Booth  and 
Cohen.  On  the  other  hand,  those  who  downplay  the  difference  be- 
tween  live  and  dead  will typically  emphasize  relations  between  meta- 
phor  and  concept-formation,  and  construe  metaphor-meaning  more 
straightforwardly  as a kind of assertion  (of resemblance,  or of identity, 
or  .  .  .  ).  Again  roughly,  and  with  varying  aptness,  this  applies  to 
Friedrich  Nietzsche,  Nelson  Goodman,  Jacques  Derrida,  and  Paul de 
Man.'8 Davidson  is distinguished  among  "live"  theorists  by his explic- 
itness  and  extremism,  and  this  has  its  virtues.  If  one  arrives  at  the 
restriction  to  live  metaphor  through  having  previously  defined meta- 
phor  in terms  of  its success at "framing-effects,"  then  the  problem  of 
accounting  for  what is said in metaphor  is highlighted.  For we cannot 
identify  believing  what  the  metaphor  says with  the  effect  of  framing 
one  thing  in terms  of another  in the  mind's  eye.  Success  at this effect 
Besides  the  two  papers just  mentioned,  the  interested  reader  should  see  Black,  "How 
Metaphors  Work." 
18.  Nietzsche  relates  the  action  of  metaphor  and  the  process  of  concept- 
formation  via  the  notion  of  "equating  what  is unequal"  [Gleichsetzen  des Nichtgleichen] 
(Nietzsche,  '"Uber Wahrheit  und  Liige  im  aussermoralischen  Sinn,"  p.  313).  On  this 
view, a metaphor  that has lost its image  through  long  use is what we call a concept,  but 
it  is still  essentially  a  metaphor.  Following  a  discussion  of  Nietzsche,  Jacques  Derrida 
asks, "Is rectification  henceforth  the  rectification  of  a metaphor  by a concept?  Are  not 
all  metaphors,  strictly  speaking,  concepts,  and  is  there  any sense in  setting  metaphor 
against  concept?"  (Derrida,  "White  Mythology:  Metaphor  in the  Text  of  Philosophy," 
Margins of Philosophy, trans.  Alan  Bass [Chicago,  1982],  p.  264).  Paul de  Man presents 
the same line  in the  course  of a reading  of Jean-Jacques  Rousseau:  "And  conceptualiza- 
tion,  conceived  as  an  exchange  or  substitution  of  properties  on  the  basis  of  resem- 
blance,  corresponds  exactly  to  the  classical  definition  of  metaphor  as  it  appears  in 
theories  of  rhetoric  from  Aristotle  to  Roman Jakobson"  (de  Man, Allegories of Reading: 
Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust [New  Haven,  Conn.,  1979],  p. 
146).  In Languages of Art, Goodman  explores  the  aspect  of  metaphor  that  involves  the 
reorganization  of  conceptual  realms  through  the  transfer  of  schemata,  a transfer  that 
survives the death  of the metaphor.  "A frozen  metaphor  has lost the vigor of youth,  but 
remains a metaphor.  Strangely,  though,  with progressive  loss of its virility as a figure  of 
speech,  a metaphor  becomes  not  less but more  like literal  truth"  (Goodman,  Languages 
of Art, p. 68). 
98  Richard Moran Autumn 1989  99 
is here  definitional of metaphor,  and even  under  this restriction  not  all 
metaphorical  utterances  produce  belief  in  what  they  say.  Davidson's 
solution  is to  say that  there  is nothing  said by  the  metaphor  beyond 
what its words  mean  literally.  Without joining  him  in this conclusion, 
it's still possible  to  see  how  his extreme  position  performs  the  service 
of  forcing  a certain  choice  on  the  theorist  of  metaphor.  Or rather,  it 
enables  us to diagnose  a certain  way of combining  a cognitive  account 
with  an exclusive  concentration  on  the  vivid effects  of  live  metaphor, 
a combination  that  produces  a confused  idea  of  the  "imagistic  force" 
of metaphor. 
For  if,  along  with  Davidson,  one  thinks  of  the  (successful)  effect 
of framing  one  thing  in terms of another  as being  the essence  of meta- 
phor,  and one  combines  this with the  non-Davidsonian  idea that meta- 
phor  involves  the  assertion  or  communication  of  some  content,  one 
may arrive  at the  idea  of  metaphor  as somehow  carrying  within  itself 
forced  assent  to  what  it  asserts.  This  is,  I think,  how  Booth  ends  up 
speaking  of  what  is irresistible  in  metaphor  in  terms  of  what  it com- 
municates.  But  communication  involves  a  relation  between  assertion 
and belief,  and is always resistible.  And part of what this means  is that 
the  notions  of  communication  and of  saying require  that a distinction 
can  always be  drawn  between  understanding  and  belief.  If  one  takes 
the  framing  or  yoking  together  involved  in  metaphor  to  be  a  non- 
assertoric  effect  of  the  utterance,  then  one  can safely define  it in terms 
of  success  in  bringing  off  such  an  effect.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  if 
this definition  is combined  with the idea of such framing  as an implicit 
assertion  of  some  kind,  then  there's  no  obvious  way for  us to  under- 
stand  "success"  here.  The  choice,  then,  is roughly  the  following.  If 
you take metaphor  to be assertive,  to be  the  communication  of a con- 
tent,  then  you  cannot  both  define  metaphor  as  a  case  of  successful 
framing  and take that  framing  (or,  say, the  resemblance  thus brought 
to  mind)  to  be  the  content  of  what  is  communicated.  And  more 
roughly  still: a theorist  who  takes some  kind of striking effect  to be es- 
sential  to  metaphor,  who  concentrates  on  live  metaphors  and  their 
imagistic  power,  is well advised  not  to think  of  metaphor  as the  asser- 
tion  of  something  distinct  from  the  literal.  Or  at  least  he  or  she  will 
have  to  look  somewhere  else  for  that  content  than  in  the  framing- 
effect  (imagistic  or otherwise)  that  the  metaphor  succeeds  in bringing 
off. 
One  further  reason  should  be  mentioned  in  favor  of  Davidson's 
idea  that  what  is distinctive  about  or  essential  to  metaphor  is on  the 
level  of effects  (of what I've called  framing  and the  like), and that the 
framing-effect  cannot  be  construed  as  the  content  of  an  assertion. 
Consideration  of  the  example  of  negative  metaphorical  statements, 
such  as "no  man  is an island,"  shows  that  the  vividness  or  force  of  a 
metaphor  cannot  be  carried  by the  assertion  of  resemblance  or  iden- 
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tity.19 For it will be seen that such an utterance  still succeeds  in yoking 
two things  together  in the  mind of the hearer,  even  though  the corre- 
sponding  statement  of  resemblance  between  the  two  things  is  here 
denied.  The  denial  of  a metaphorical  statement  still retains  the  effect 
of  framing,  of  seeing  one  thing  in terms  of  another.  What is retained 
in such  a case  can't be  the  same  thing  that  is asserted  in the  affirma- 
tive metaphor-statement,  and can't be the same thing  that is a possible 
object  of  belief  in the  affirmative  statement.  Otherwise  the  statement 
and its denial  would  make the  same assertion,  express  the  same belief. 
It  is this  sense  of  the  framing-effect  as a positive  thing  that  a subse- 
quent  denial  of  the  statement  is powerless  to  undo  which  I believe  is 
responsible  for  the  talk  of  compulsion  and  involuntary  complicity  in 
discussions  of  metaphor.  Even  Davidson  speaks  of  the  audience  for 
metaphor  being  "bullied"  into  making  a  certain  comparison 
("WMM," p.  39).  Something  like  this  is surely  part  of  what  is meant 
by the  "force"  of  a good  metaphor;  but  in such  cases what  is forced, 
or can't be undone,  is not a believing  of what is asserted.20 
On  the  other  hand,  it's not  at all unlikely  that  the  exclusive  im- 
portance  of belief in such contexts  has been  somewhat  oversold  in phil- 
osophical  thinking  on  the  subject.  There  are  more  ways of  changing 
someone's  mind  than  changing  his or  her  beliefs.  Although  this  may 
be most easily seen  in the case of rhetoric,  it is quite  generally  true for 
both philosophy  and literature  that much of what they aim at is not on 
the  level  of  specifically  altered  beliefs  but  rather  such  things  as 
changes  in the  associations  and comparisons  one  makes,  differences  in 
the  vivid  or  "felt"  appreciation  of  something  already  known,  or 
changes  in  one's  habits  of  attention  and  sense  of  the  important  and 
the  trifling.  And  although  such changes  of mind are something  differ- 
ent  from  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  certain  beliefs,  there  is noth- 
ing  to  be  gained  by  assimilating  them  all  to  the  category  of  the 
19.  Cohen  has  discussed  such  cases  as  examples  of  metaphors,  which  he  calls 
"twice  true,"  that  is,  statements  that  are  true  both  as  literal  statements  and  as meta- 
phors.  See  his  "Notes  on  Metaphor,"  Journal  of Aesthetics  and Art Criticism 34  (Spring 
1976): 249-59. 
20.  Even though  the framing-effect  is itself independent  of the assertoric  mood,  it 
will naturally very often  be exploited  by that mood.  In such a case the  "force"  in ques- 
tion  can  quite  directly  involve  change  of  belief.  Kenneth  Burke  considers  the 
"'unearned  increment"'  of associated  ideas gained  by a political  speaker who argues  for 
some  measure  in terms of  the  image  of  the  mother  rather  than in terms  of  the  abstract 
idea of  "security."  See his Rhetoric  of Motives (Berkeley,  1969),  p. 87.  We can see at least 
two rhetorical  advantages  to  such  a tactic.  It will lend  persuasive  force  to  an utterance 
not  only  because  the  speaker  can communicate  the  other  associated  ideas  (of tradition, 
affection,  and  so on)  without  committing  himself  to  them,  but  also  because  such  ideas 
are received  by the audience  more  as discoveries  about something  than as claims made by 
some  (possibly unreliable)  person. 
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"noncognitive."  Appreciation  of  this  will  have  literary,  political,  and 
philosophical  consequences  for the criticism of metaphor. 
Images and the Unmentionable 
The  indifference  of  the  force  of  a good  metaphor  to  the  moods 
of affirmation  or denial  may also be part of what suggests  the  compar- 
ison  with  pictures.  The  framing-effect  of  a  metaphor  survives  when 
the  statement  is  denied,  subsumed  in  a  hypothetical  or  a  part  of  a 
question,  or placed  in quotation  marks. And  whether  or  not  we want 
to  say that  a picture  means anything,  it  does  whatever  it  is a picture 
does  in  a way that  has nothing  to  do  with  the  different  grammatical 
moods.  And  this is important  for  the  effectiveness  of both  metaphors 
and pictures. 
There  are  often  advantages,  rhetorical  and  otherwise,  in  some- 
how letting  a certain  thing  be known or inferred  by your audience,  in- 
stead of explicitly  saying it. A picture  can be used  to get  a point  across 
without  incurring  the  risks and responsibilities  of asserting  that point. 
This  can disarm criticism  of the point  being  made,  while  retaining  the 
intended  effect  of  the  picture.  Likewise,  in verbal  abuse  it is also pos- 
sible  to  make  one's  message  clear  not  only  without  asserting  it,  but 
while  explicitly  denying  or  disavowing  it.  If  what  is  objectionable 
about  some  utterance  is in what it says or asserts, then  the response  of 
denial  and counterassertion  is appropriate,  and such a response  is suc- 
cessful to the extent  that what it says is believed  instead  of the  original 
statement.  Yet  there  are other  aspects  of  an utterance  that  cannot  be 
countered  in this way. Among  these  are such things  as mentioning  or 
bringing  up something  (without  explicitly  saying anything  about  it), or 
repeating  someone  else's  words  in a mocking  tone  of  voice,  and mak- 
ing  a certain  comparison  or  drawing  attention  to  something  without 
making  any  particular  claim  about  it.  The  invidious  comparison  of 
one's  rival with  a hyena  can be  successfully  accomplished  even  in the 
context  of  explicit  denial  that  that  is what  one  is doing,  or when  one 
claims  to  be  making  no  assertion  of  one's  own  but  merely  quoting 
someone  else's words.  Here  since the damaging  effect  is not carried by 
the assertion,  it is not well countered  by a denial of the assertion. 
For example,  praeteritio  exploits  the  fact that  something  decisive 
gets  through  to  the  audience  even  when  the  nested  assertion  is de- 
nied,  subsumed  in a hypothetical,  a part of a question,  and so on.  "If I 
were  to  bring  up  the  sordid  facts  of  his private  life  I could justly  be 
accused  of  descending  into  personal  attack,  therefore  I merely.  ...  " 
Praeteritio  relies  on,  and  furthers,  those  aspects  of  a  statement  that 
are indifferent  to  its grammatical  mood,  which  include  mentioning  or 
referring  to things,  as well as the  vividness  and force  of  a good  meta- 
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phor.  Praeteritio  will  be  more  memorable  and  more  effective  when 
the  nested  assertion  is a live  metaphor;  for  everything  relating  to  the 
effect  of  seeing  one  thing  as framed  by another  will survive  the  pre- 
tended  disavowal.  Elaborate  metaphorical  verbal  abuse  like  this  will 
naturally  make  the  bad  faith  of  the  disavowal  transparent,  for  it will 
reveal  the  work of  the  figure,  and not  the  assertion,  to have been  the 
point all along. 
Pictures share with metaphors  the capacity to get a point  across in 
a way that is indifferent  to grammatical  mood  or to the  distinction  be- 
tween  bringing  something  up  and  saying  something  in  particular 
about it. Grammatical mood  and the distinction  between  assertion  and 
"mere"  mention  simply  don't  apply  to  pictures.  In  language we  can 
distinguish  between  reproducing  someone's  utterance  when  it  is 
quoted,  and reproducing  someone's  words to make the  same assertion 
oneself.  On  the  other  hand,  when  it comes  to  reproducing  a picture, 
there  doesn't  seem  to  be  anything  like  the  distinction  between  men- 
tion  and use,  and  it's not  clear  that  either  of  the  alternatives  has any 
application,  or  that  pictures  per  se  have  the  notational  resources  for 
actual quotation.  There  is indeed  a sense  in which  one  picture  may al- 
lude to or even  contain  another  one.  But such reference  or allusion  to 
another  picture  is not  analogous  to  the  distinction  between  asserting 
something  oneself  and quoting  the  words of  someone  else's  assertion. 
Verbal quotation  abstracts from  the context  of a particular speech  act, 
whether  assertion,  question,  or  command.  However  we want  to  char- 
acterize  what a picture  does  when  it makes us see  something  in a cer- 
tain  way,  or  when  it  comments  on  something,  or  suggests  a  certain 
comparison,  it accomplishes  this in a way that is indifferent  to the  dis- 
tinction  between  quotation  and assertion. 
Because  of  this,  church  leaders  and  others  interested  in banning 
certain  pictures  are sometimes  faced  with the problem  that there  is no 
such thing  as "mere"  quotation  of pictures,  that reproducing  them  for 
purposes  of commentary  and censure  entails  repeating  the  effects  that 
were  the  object  of censure  in the  first place.  In speech  one  can repro- 
duce  someone  else's  statement  without  asserting  it  oneself,  that  is, 
when  one just  quotes  it.  So  if  it is the  assertion  and  the  belief  it ex- 
presses  that  is  objectionable,  one  can  avoid  compounding  what  is 
wrong  by reproducing  it in a quotation,  a question,  or a hypothetical. 
On  the  other  hand,  pictures  can't  be  "merely"  quoted  since  there  is 
no  assertoric  dimension  to  abstract  from.21  (Naturally  this  doesn't 
mean  there  may not be anything  to object  to,  nor that a picture  is not 
21.  See  Peirce,  "Logic  as Semiotic:  The  Theory  of  Signs,"  p.  I11:  "Icons  and in- 
dices  assert  nothing.  If an icon  could  be  interpreted  by a sentence,  that  sentence  must 
be in a 'potential  mood,'  that is, it would  merely  say, 'Suppose  a figure  has three  sides,' 
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both  productive  of  and  reflective  of  particular  beliefs.)  The  anxiety 
concerning  the  impossibility  of  "mere"  quotation  in pictures  may be 
compared  to  the  anxiety  concerning  the  inadequacy  of  quotation 
when  verbal  obscenities  are  in  question.  My grandmother  would  no 
more  quote  someone  else's  indecent  language  than  she  would  use  it 
herself.  The  distinction  between  use  and  mention  would  seem  point- 
less here,  since  what  matters  about  verbal obscenity  is on  the  level  of 
effects  carried  by the  utterance,  and not the  particular  assertion  made 
by  it.  Quoting  such  an  obscene  statement  does  not  neutralize  or  dis- 
arm it; nor does  it neutralize  the effect  of a strong  metaphor.22 
Praeteritio  requires  the  pretense  that  the  language-game  being 
played  is one  of  assertion  and  counterassertion  (a  language-game  to 
which  the  possibility  of  quoting  rather than asserting  is  internal),  so 
that  the  disavowal  of  a particular  claim  is supposed  to  leave  one's  op- 
ponent  with  no  recourse,  since  there  is  no  (relevant)  claim  to  be 
countered.  Such  a pretense  becomes  laughably  transparent  when  the 
disavowal  involves  abusive  verbal  obscenity.  The  pretense  is  only 
slightly  less  transparent  when  the  praeteritio  is  conducted  in  richly 
metaphorical  language  (which  is  what  most  verbal  obscenity  is  any- 
way).  In  both  cases  what  is crucial  to  the  utterance  is not  carried  by 
the  assertion,  yet  it is smuggled  in under  cover  of  the  language-game 
of  assertion.  By contrast,  there  is no  corresponding  technique  for pic- 
torial praeteritio  because  there  is no corresponding  pretense  of  a con- 
text  of  assertion  for us to  flirt with,  a context  of  assertion  which  may 
be cancelled  through  "mere"  quotation.  Recently  it was reported  that 
Princess  Diana was made  upset by an ugly puppet  caricature  of her on 
television.  In the  supermarket  paper  announcing  this,  the  mock  com- 
passionate  headline  "This  Cruel  Puppet  Made  Poor  Princess  Di  Cry" 
was,  of  course,  accompanied  by  a  full-page  picture  of  the  offensive 
puppet  in  question.  Here  one  couldn't  even  pretend  to  claim  to  be 
doing  something  like merely  quoting  rather than something  like assert- 
ing.  Any objection  to the original  applies equally to the duplicate.  The 
distinction  between  assertion  and  (mere)  quotation  doesn't  obtain 
here;  hence  there's  no  room  for  pretense  involving  shifting  from  one 
context  to the other. 
22.  Alternatively,  one  could  say that  the  effective  functioning  of  metaphor  is in- 
different  to the  distinction  between  quotation  and assertion  because  the  symbolic  work- 
ings  of  metaphor  require  that  the  utterance  be  treated  as  if  it  were  already  within 
quotation  marks. This  idea is central  to Dan Sperber's  account  of symbolism  in general, 
both  verbal  and  nonverbal;  see  his  Rethinking Symbolism, trans.  Alice  L.  Morton 
(Cambridge,  1975),  pp.  99-105.  One  accepts the  symbolic  utterance  before  knowing  its 
meaning,  as  one  may  know  a  certain  quoted  sentence  to  be  a  true  sentence  without 
knowing  what statement  it expresses.  Taking  the  utterance  in quotes  is what opens  it to 
interpretation. 
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Recovering Meaning 
These  considerations  about  the  functioning  of  nonassertoric  ef- 
fects  offer  some  support  for  Davidson's  case  against  thinking  of  the 
meaning  of a metaphor  as the  content  of  an assertion,  and are meant 
to  throw  some  light  on  the  familiar  comparison  of  the  workings  of 
metaphor  with  pictures  or  images.  Nonetheless  there  are  several  rea- 
sons  for  thinking  that  this  can't  be  the  whole  of  the  story.  For  one 
thing,  if  the  metaphoric  utterance  makes  no  assertion  at  all  (other 
than  the  literal  one),  the  idea  of  a denial of  it won't  make  any  sense 
either,  except  in  the  unlikely  cases where  what  one  means  to  deny  is 
the  literal categorical  falsehood  carried by the  words.  For just  as what 
I've  called  "negative  metaphor"  is still  metaphor,  so  the  denial  of  a 
metaphorical  statement  is normally  the  denial  of  the  statement  taken 
metaphorically  and  not  literally.  But  then  there  must  be  some  meta- 
phorical  statement  being  denied,  a statement  distinct  from  the  literal 
one.  So even  if, as I've said, the  denial of a metaphorical  statement  re- 
tains  the  framing-effect  of  the  original  assertion,  that  does  not  mean 
that  something  has  not  been  denied.  It  must  be  possible  to  deny  a 
statement  taken  metaphorically;  it must also  be  possible  to  either  un- 
derstand  or  misunderstand  such  a statement,  that  is,  to  take  it meta- 
phorically  but take it in the wrong  way. 
It  doesn't  seem  possible  to  describe  this  sort  of  familiar  case 
within  Davidson's  theory,  and  it's  not  easy  to  determine  what  he 
would  even  want to  say on  this point.  For he  denies  that  metaphor  is 
"a  form  of  communication"  or  "primarily  a  vehicle  for  conveying 
ideas,"  and  he  denies  that  the  speaker  of  metaphor  says anything  be- 
yond  the  literal  ("WMM,"  p.  30).  But  he  does  not deny  that  a meta- 
phor  has  a  point  ("WMM,"  p.  30),  or  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as 
"understand[ing]"  a metaphor  ("WMM," p. 31), which involves  seeing 
"what  the  author  of  a metaphor  wanted  us to  see"  ("WMM,"  p.  45); 
and  he  says that  the  decision  to  use  a certain  metaphor  rather  than 
the  corresponding  simile  involves  choosing  "to  get  the  idea  across  a 
different  way" ("WMM," p. 39).  It's not obvious  how such concessions 
can leave his account  with much  more  than  "an insistence  on restraint 
in  using  the  word  'meaning,"'  or  can  be  consistent  with  his  central 
denial  that  "associated  with  a metaphor  is a cognitive  content  that  its 
author  wishes to convey  and that the  interpreter  must grasp if he is to 
get  the  message"  ("WMM,"  p.  44).25  Whatever  we  want  to  call  it, 
there  is that in the  metaphoric  utterance  which is distinct  from  the  lit- 
There  are  some  clear  affinities  (as well  as differences)  between  what  I say about 
metaphor  here  and what  Sperber  says about  symbolism,  and  I  have  profited  from  his 
book. 
23.  In reprinting  this  article,  Davidson  made  a few  changes  and  altered  this  sen- 
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eral assertion,  which  can be understood  or misunderstood,  and which 
we  interpret  in a way that  depends,  in part,  on  our  beliefs  about  the 
speaker's  beliefs.  That  is,  in  order  to  understand  what  the  speaker 
means  who  tells  us  that  "man  is  not  a man,  but  a wolf,  to  those  he 
does  not know,"  we have to rely on what we take him to believe  about 
wolves  and  what  is important  about  them.  And  if we  are very  wrong 
about  this, we will misunderstand  what he means  to convey  (say, if we 
thought  he believed  wolves  were  benign  parasites).  And  we are not  in 
the  same  way  dependent  on  anyone's  beliefs  when  a  bump  on  the 
head  makes us appreciate  the  fact that we forgot  to duck, which  is the 
reason  we don't  think of  this situation  as involving  the  communication 
of anything. 
The  claim  that  metaphor  involves  the  communication  of  content 
is independent  of the claim that it involves  a change  in the meaning  of 
the  words.  Talk  about  "meaning"  is probably  best  avoided  anyway, 
since  its range  is so wide and there's  so little  agreement  about  it. The 
independence  of  the  two  claims,  however,  can be  seen  by comparing 
metaphor  with  irony.  Like  metaphor,  irony  operates  in a way that  is 
dependent  on  the  standard  meanings  of  the  words  used,  and  this  de- 
pendence  is exploited  in order  to express  something  distinct  from  the 
standard  meaning  of  the  assertion.  And  as far as I know,  no  one  has 
yet denied  that irony or sarcasm involve  the intention  to convey  some- 
thing  distinct  from  the  literal,  something  that can be missed or misun- 
derstood.  Still,  at the  same  time,  no  one  claims  that  irony  or  sarcasm 
involve  a change  of  meaning  in the  words  used.  We  speak  ironically, 
but  we  don't  speak  of  ironic  uses  of  words,  or  of  attaching  an ironic 
sense  to a word.  When  someone  says ironically  of his betrayer  that he 
is "a fine  friend,"  he doesn't  mean  that he is ironically a fine  friend,  or 
that  he  is  one  in  an  ironic  sense.  And  nothing  in  ironic  speech  at- 
taches  to the  individual  words in such a way as to eventually  enter  the 
dictionary.  (In this sense,  there  are no  "dead ironies.")  Irony  attaches 
to whole  utterances,  not  individual  words.  And  it manages  to commu- 
nicate  something  distinct  from  the  literal  (when  it  does)  without 
change  in the meanings  of the words. 
For both  ironic  and metaphorical  utterances,  it is the  fact that we 
can either  understand  or misunderstand  them,  and that we rely on be- 
liefs about  the  speaker's beliefs  in order  to understand,  that makes the 
situation  a communicative  one.  And  the  possibility  of  misunderstand- 
ing,  along  with this reliance  on beliefs  about  the  speaker,  must be part 
of an account  of  metaphor  if it is to avoid  consequences  that trivialize 
metaphor  beyond  recognition.  Davidson  mentions  this  possibility  in 
tence  to be  the  denial  that metaphor  has a "definite"  cognitive  content  associated  with 
it (Davidson,  Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation  [Oxford,  1984],  p. 262).  But the  ques- 
tion of definiteness  makes no essential  difference  to the main point. 
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the  course  of  criticizing  theories  of  metaphor  that  make  it  out  as a 
compressed  or elliptical  simile: 
They  make  the  hidden  meaning  of  the  metaphor  all too  obvious 
and  accessible.  In  each  case  the  hidden  meaning  is to  be  found 
simply by looking  to  the  literal  meaning  of  what is usually a pain- 
fully  trivial  simile.  This  is  like  that-Tolstoy  like  an  infant,  the 
earth  like  a  floor.  It  is  trivial  because  everything  is  like  every- 
thing,  and in endless  ways. ["WMM," p. 37] 
The  endless  trivial ways in which  one  thing  can be  like another  show 
up just  how endless  are the  ways in which one  can go  wrong  in the  in- 
terpretation  of a metaphor.  It may well be  true,  as Davidson  says, that 
"a metaphor  makes us attend  to some  likeness"  ("WMM," p.  31),  but 
it is not  true  that  attending  to just  any of  the  infinite  aspects  of  like- 
ness  between  the  two  things  counts  as understanding  the  metaphor. 
And  we  are  guided  by  our  beliefs  about  what  the  speaker  believes 
about  the  things  in  question  when  we  select  from  this  infinity  in  the 
process of interpreting  the metaphor. 
But  the  point  about  our  selectivity  and  its dependence  on  beliefs 
about  the  speaker  goes  deeper  than  this.  This  selectivity  is not  simply 
an  aid  to  avoiding  error  in  interpretation.  Rather,  the  process  of  in- 
terpretation  couldn't  even  begin  without  some  sense  of  which  are the 
relevant  dimensions  of  the  comparison.  For  it  is  not  as  if  we  could 
take  all  the  facts  and  beliefs  about  wolves  (whatever  that  would  be) 
and use them  as a perspective  on all the  facts about  people's  relations 
to  strangers.  That  wouldn't  provide  us with  so much  as a perspective 
to begin  interpreting.  The  metaphor  will not  succeed  in getting  us to 
see  anything  as  anything  without  our  having  some  previous  under- 
standing  of which aspects  of  a wolf  are being  used  as a perspective  on 
which aspects of human  beings.  (The  fact that they may both  have grey 
hair,  or  require  sleep,  is probably  not  the  point.)  It  is thus  arguable 
that an utterly uninterpreted  metaphor,  one  for which  we have no clue 
which  features  are  irrelevant,  does  not  yet  succeed  in even  "yoking" 
two things  together.  That  is, we must have  some  sense  of  the  field  of 
comparison,  otherwise  "yoking"  or  "framing"  can  mean  no  more 
than  the  empty  exercise  of  keeping  the  two  things  together  in mind: 
the taste of sugar and the discovery  of America. 
An account  of metaphor  that denies  that it is a form of communi- 
cation  will thus not  only  have  difficulty  saying what understanding  or 
misunderstanding  can  consist  in,  it  will  also  encounter  problems  in 
saying  how  the  nonassertoric  framing-effect  takes  place.24 For,  as  I 
24.  For  similar  reasons,  Davidson  lacks  an  account  of  why  all  similes  are  not 
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briefly  suggested,  the  effect  of  framing  one  thing  in terms  of  another 
is itself dependent  on a prior understanding  of what areas of compari- 
son are relevant,  and determination  of  this relevance  is dependent  on 
what we take the  speaker  to  have  in mind.  This  is not  to  say that  the 
interpretation  of  metaphor  is restricted  to  an elaboration  of  what  its 
author  is taken  to  have  understood  by it. There  is more  to  the  inter- 
pretation  of  any  utterance  than  that.  And  it is especially  the  case with 
metaphorical  speech  that  its author  too  will often  expect  there  to  be 
more  in it than he originally  thought,  and will hope  to be surprised  by 
where  its explication  leads him.  Still, the dependence  on the  speaker is 
not  eliminable  in an account  of  either  the  interpretation  of  metaphor 
or its original  framing-effect.  A noncognitive  theory  of  metaphor  will 
not be able to account  for this dependence  on beliefs  about  the  speak- 
er's beliefs,  or say what  it is that  we  depend  on  such beliefsfor.  Such 
an account  will not  be  able  to say that we depend  on  those  beliefs  for 
the  determination  of  the  (nonliteral)  content  that  the  speaker  meant 
to communicate. 
Metaphoric  Thought 
The  speaker's  beliefs  about  wolves  and men,  or tempests  and tea- 
pots,  must also be part of any account  of what he is doing  in formulat- 
ing  the  metaphor  in  the  first  place.  We  need  an  explanation  of  his 
devising just  the  particular  metaphor  he does.  It's not just  a matter  of 
his  manufacturing  some  phrase  and  seeing  what  effect  it  will  have 
when  uttered.25 In  the  effort  to  formulate  a  metaphorical  statement 
there  will often  be considerable  struggle  before  one  feels  one  has "got 
it right,"  that the  right  adjustment  has been  made.  If Davidson  is cor- 
rect,  however,  there  can't  be  anything  one  is getting  right  here.  But 
when  a metaphor  is "right,"  it is so  not  only  for  what  it  gets  one  to 
notice,  but  also  for  its  adequacy  in  expressing  what  one  has  already 
noticed.  The  speaker  or  writer  has  certain  beliefs  about  wolves  and 
about  human  behavior,  and  he  is thinking  about  one  in terms  of  the 
other.  To  get  to  this  point,  however,  he  had  to  have  certain  beliefs 
25.  In his reply to Davidson,  Black says that if Davidson  is understood as offering 
a kind of speech-act theory of metaphor then he cannot account for the use of meta- 
phor by a soliloquizing thinker, for whatever resemblance metaphor is supposed to 
draw attention to will necessarily  have already occurred to the thinker (Black, "How 
Metaphors  Work," pp. 188-89). I think Davidson  could reply that the solitary thinker 
can still benefit from the nonassertoric  effects of a good metaphor, and that soliloquy  is 
no more mysterious here than when one asks oneself a question and answers it. The 
point I'm making here, on the other hand, separates  the issue of the cognitivity  of met- 
aphor from that of its role in assertion  and communication,  and locates the problem in 
the composition  of metaphor,  and not in soliloquy. 
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about human  interaction  that suggested  the comparison  with wolves in 
the  first  place  and  that  determine  which  aspects  of  that  relation  the 
comparison  is meant  to  illuminate.  The  effort  to  formulate  a particu- 
lar metaphor  is initially  guided  by and  in the  service  of  these  beliefs. 
The  right  phrase,  the  right  comparison,  will both  sharpen  and organ- 
ize  these  thoughts  as well  as lead  the  composer  to  notice  new  things, 
leading  to  new  thoughts.  Without  referring  to  those  (perhaps  vague 
or  indeterminate)  initiating  beliefs,  we  cannot  account  for  why  that 
particular  metaphor  was devised,  why that comparison  seemed  apt or 
not.  And once  such beliefs  are included  in the account  of the composi- 
tion  of  the  metaphor,  there  seems  little  motivation  left  for  denying 
that  these  beliefs,  indeterminate  or  not,  are  at least  part  of  what  the 
speaker means to communicate. 
I  have  used  terms  like  "framing-effect"  and  "perspective"  to 
speak  of  the  dimension  of  metaphor  that  is distinct  from  what  is as- 
serted  either  literally  or  metaphorically.  As  the  word  "perspective" 
suggests,  this aspect of  metaphor  is not  itself  an object  of belief  or de- 
nial.  It  is the  effect  of  a poetic  metaphor  that  survives  denial  and  is 
indifferent  to  quotation  or  grammatical  mood.  It is concentration  on 
this dimension  that  suggests  the  comparison  of  metaphor  with figures 
or pictures.  Success in bringing  off  this effect,  in bringing  someone  to 
adopt  this  perspective  momentarily,  is  independent  of  belief  in  any 
particular assertion.  Hence  confusing  the  framing-effect  with an asser- 
tion of some  kind can lead to misinterpreting  the force  of metaphor  as 
a kind of forced  assent  to what it says, as if it were  the  assertion  itself 
which was found  to be irresistible. 
Speaking  of  the  adoption  of  a perspective  is useful  precisely  be- 
cause  it is neutral  with respect  to belief  and assertion.  But if this were 
the  only  dimension  of  metaphor,  then  we  couldn't  explain,  among 
other  things,  what  denying  the  statement  comes  to.  For  the  denial  is 
not  the  refusal  to  adopt  the  perspective,  any  more  than  the  original 
statement  is  simply  the  invitation  to  take  up  that  perspective.  The 
speaker  does  not  say, "Imagine  Juliet  as the  sun"; rather  he  makes  a 
statement  about  Juliet. She is the object  of his thinking,  and various be- 
liefs of his about her are necessary  to account  for his original  adoption 
of  this  perspective.  And  someone  who  denies  that  statement  will  be 
sharing that perspective  for the moment,  but disagreeing  with some  of 
what Romeo  believes. 
To  sum up,  then:  there  are  two  dimensions  of  metaphor,  the  di- 
mension  of  effects,  which  I've  referred  to  in terms  of  framing  or  the 
adoption  of  a  perspective,  and  the  dimension  of  the  beliefs  that 
prompt  the  comparison  in the  first place,  and which  are necessary  for 
the  framing-effect  to  be  something  other  than  mere  juxtaposition. 
The  belief-dimension  must  have  a  place  in  the  account  of  both  the 
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ing  of  it.  In  the  case  of  the  composer,  he  does  not  simply  come  up 
with an expression,  accept  its adequacy,  and then  figure  out  what it is 
adequate  to  and  in just  what  ways. Rather  he  will have,  for  example, 
various beliefs  about  one  person's  relation  to another  that lead him to 
see  it as wolfish,  that  is,  to  take  up  the  perspective  of  wolfishness  on 
this  relation.  And  it  is natural  to  assume  that  these  initiating  beliefs 
are  part  of  what  he  means  to  communicate.  Without  these  beliefs 
there  is no  way to  account  for  metaphoric  thinking  or  the  process  of 
composition.  And  the  audience,  on  the  other  hand,  depends  on  these 
beliefs  both  for  any framing-effect  at all (without  which  we  don't  yet 
have  a metaphor)  and  for  the  provisional  interpretation  of  it.  At  this 
stage  of  the  understanding  of  metaphor  we  look  more  to  the  speaker 
than to the  world,  for  his false beliefs  (for example,  about  the  vicious- 
ness  of  wolves)  will  be  as  important  to  us  as  the  actual  facts  about 
wolves. 
Nonetheless,  both  the  composer's  elaboration  of  the  metaphor  in 
thought  or speech,  and the  audience's  interpretation  of  it, go  beyond 
these  initiating  beliefs,  even  though  both  processes  are dependent  on 
them.  The  composer  adopts  the  perspective  he does  partly because  he 
expects  that it will lead the  mind  in unanticipated  directions.  It is pos- 
sible to  get  more  out  of  it than  one  has explicitly  put into  it. And  the 
audience  as well  may engage  in interpretation  of  the  metaphor  that is 
an  exploratory  elaboration  of  it,  and  which  involves  attention  to  the 
world  rather  than to the  speaker.  It is a portion  of the world, after  all, 
that  we  have  taken  a certain  perspective  on; and  at this further  stage 
of  interpretation  we may leave  the  speaker  behind,  as he  himself  may 
leave  behind  his initiating  beliefs  and his own  provisional  understand- 
ing  of  the  metaphor.  We  have  taken  up  the  particular  framework  or 
perspective,  and now we pursue  what can be noticed  from  it.26 This  is 
the  less communicative  dimension  of  metaphor,  the  one  which  David- 
son  concentrates  on  and  which  involves  adoption  of  a  perspective 
rather than acceptance  of  an assertion.  It is the  less communicative  as- 
pect,  since it is independent  of the utterance's  role  in making an asser- 
tion  (as opposed  to,  say, a question  or  the  negation  of  the  assertion). 
This,  however,  doesn't  mean  that  it  is a  noncognitive dimension,  for 
not  only  are the  initiating  beliefs  part of  the  structure  and content  of 
this framing-effect,  but the  effect  itself prompts  and guides  the  elabo- 
ration  of  the  metaphor  in  thought.  This  effect  is  what  dies  in  the 
death  of  the  metaphor,  when  it loses  its vividness  and  suggestiveness, 
while  it survives  the  denial  or quotation  of  the  metaphoric  statement. 
26.  One  hazard  of  discussing  literary  metaphors  outside  the  context  of  the  texts 
in  which  they  operate  is that  it draws attention  away from  the  otherwise  obvious  fact 
that  the  choice  and  development  of  a  particular  metaphor  is  also  answerable  to  the 
whole  metaphoric  system of the  text,  both  intra- and intertextual. 
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Whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  it is something  of  the  other  aspect-the 
initiating  beliefs  linking,  say, bottle  openings  and  mouths-that  sur- 
vives the death of the metaphor  and that is denied  in the denial. 
A good  metaphor  does  not just  sum up the beliefs  that led to it; it 
is meant  to  amplify  and  focus  them,  bringing  them  into  contact  with 
others.  There  will  often  be  no  sharp  line  between  the  earlier  ideas 
that  motivated  a  particular  metaphor  and  the  later  ones  that  it,  in 
turn,  motivates.  This  raises the  question  of the  relation  between  these 
two dimensions  of metaphor:  between  the adoption  of the perspective, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  thoughts  that  led  to  it and  that  it leads  to, 
on the other.  Such thoughts  do not justify the adoption  of the perspec- 
tive; or,  at least,  the  relation  is not  like  that  of  various  particular  be- 
liefs to a general  one  that is inferred  from  them.  We may say that the 
initiating  thoughts  suggest the  perspective,  but  that's  not  very helpful. 
We  saw that  we  must  consider  the  composer  of  the  metaphor  as first 
having  some  ideas about,  for  example,  people's  relations  to  strangers. 
What is it that motivates  doing  anything with these  beliefs  at this point, 
beyond just  retaining  them? And  what is it that taking up the perspec- 
tive  of  wolfishness  is  supposed  to  accomplish  with  regard  to  these 
thoughts?  It  may  be  said  that  the  perspective  organizes  them;  but  a 
metaphor  is not  simply  a  mnemonic  device,  and  in  any  case  we  still 
have  to  account  for  the  further  thoughts  that  are  prompted  by  the 
perspective.  There  is,  then,  a  question  about  what  motivates  going 
from  one's  initiating  thoughts  about  the  object  to  the  adoption  of  a 
metaphoric  perspective  on  it,  and  a question  about  how  the  perspec- 
tive is related  to the  further  thoughts  it leads to.  And  these  two ques- 
tions  must,  I  think,  be  answered  together.  For  surely  part  of  the 
reason  the  composer  of  the  metaphor  adopts  a particular  perspective 
is that  he  or  she  expects  and  wants  it  to  lead  him  or  her  to  notice 
something  new, to thoughts  that are relevant  to the object. 
If we could  say more  about  the  relation  of  the  perspective  to  the 
new  thoughts  it  prompts,  beyond  just  saying  that  it  prompts  them, 
then  we  could  say  more  about  what  motivates  going  from  one's 
original  beliefs  to  the  adoption  of  any  perspective  in  the  first  place. 
For,  outside  the  use  of  metaphors  as  models  in  scientific  theory- 
construction,  the  explication  or following  up of  a metaphor  is not  the 
framing  of a hypothesis.  And  its suggestiveness  and the  aptness  of the 
ideas  it leads to  are  not  taken  to  be  explanatory of,  say, the  nature  of 
anyone's  relation  to  strangers  (as if we  were  descended  from  wolves, 
and so partook  of their essence).  No  doubt  many explanatory  theories, 
good  and  bad,  begin  life  as metaphors.  But  this is not  what  the  ordi- 
nary engagement  with  or  contemplation  of  a living  metaphor  is like. 
On the  other  hand,  neither  is it like finding  the  shape of a camel  or a 
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the object,  and regard  it differently,  and don't  simply rebound  associa- 
tively from it. 
As  the  discussion  of  praeteritio  suggested,  it is easier  to  say how 
the  picturing-dimension  of  metaphor  may  operate,  and  what  it  may 
gain for  the  speaker,  in the  context  of  speech  acts, rhetoric,  and deal- 
ing  with  others.  It is harder  to  give  an account  of  the  cognitive  func- 
tion  of  the  framing-effect  in  the  context  of  the  composition  of  the 
metaphor  in thought.  For this we would  need  a better  understanding 
of  such  things  as the  figures  one  may find  both  uncashable  and  ines- 
capable  in  one's  thinking,  and  the  situations  of  provisionally  writing 
beyond  oneself,  or  beyond  one's  present  understanding  of  what  one 
has  written.  For  the  turn  to  metaphor  is not just  slippage;  it  is also 
a  calculated  and  conditional  surrender  to  a  quite  particular  verbal 
constellation. 
Figures and Pictures 
The  story  of  metaphor's  association  with  imagery  and  force  is a 
tangled  one,  and  further  clarity  here  awaits  a  better  understanding 
both  of  how  pictures  themselves  signify  and  of  how  imagination  tells 
us  anything  about  the  world.  In  the  case  of  metaphor,  some  of  the 
tangle  is undone  when  we  disambiguate  phrases  describing  it  as  the 
"visibility  of  discourse."  This  could  mean  what  Ted  Cohen  means 
when  he speaks of metaphor  as an utterance  that draws attention  to it- 
self  and  its  form,  and  throws  into  relief  features  of  communication 
that are normally  invisible  because  taken  for granted.27 Or the  phrase 
may be  understood  as Dan  Sperber  understands  it: the  figurative  ut- 
terance  is represented  in quotes  prior  to  interpretation  and  is thus  a 
relatively  opaque  use  of  language  reflecting  attention  back  on  itself. 
Either understanding  of  "visibility"  is compatible  with a denial  of  any 
special  role  for  images  as such  in  the  functioning  of  metaphor.  And 
neither  of  them  should  be  confused  with  the  idea  of  metaphor  as the 
trope  of resemblance.  For even  if resemblance  required  images,  it is a 
relation  between  the  things  compared,  and not  a relation  between  the 
discourse  and something  else.  If there  is an iconic  dimension  to meta- 
phor,  it is not  on the  level  of the  linguistic  sign itself.  Metaphor  is not 
onomatopoeia  or part of a Cratylism of  language.  But while  it doesn't 
itself  resemble  anything  of  the  right  kind,  the  metaphoric  utterance 
creates  a motivated  sign out  of  something  else.  It makes the  wolf  sym- 
bolize  someone's  treatment  of  strangers;  it  is  the  wolf,  and  not  the 
27.  Cohen,  "Metaphor  and the  Cultivation  of Intimacy,"  p. 6. 
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form  of  the  discourse,  which  stands  in a figurative  relation  to  what  it 
represents. 
The  particular  features  of  such  a symbol  that  are  relevant  to  its 
representation  of its object  are not specifiable  in advance,  and are not 
discoverable  by reference  to  any code  or  formula.  We  know  that  not 
every fact  about  wolves  is part  of  the  comparison,  yet  we  also  know 
that we don't  know in advance  every  fact that is part of it. This  distin- 
guishes  metaphor  from  the  formal  analogies  in  geometry  or  music 
theory,  which  both  systematically  restrict  the  relevant  dimensions  of 
resemblance  and  provide  rules  for  going  from  one  element  to  an- 
other.  The  relationship  between  the wolf and what it symbolizes  is not 
so  defined.  And  because  it  is  not,  we  cannot  specify just  which  fea- 
tures  are  essential  to  it  and  must  be  shared  by  any  replacement  ex- 
pression,  nor  which  features  of  the  symbol  are  indifferent  to  its 
symbolizing  function  (as are,  for  example,  the  color  and width  of  the 
chalk lines of  the figures  in a geometry  problem).28 This  is a source  of 
what is sometimes  called  the  problem  of  paraphrase,  the  impossibility 
of  finding  a  straight  prose  equivalent  for  a  poetic  metaphor.  For  a 
fully meant  poetic  metaphor,  we have  to take seriously  the  fact that it 
is not  determined  in  advance just  which  features  of  it  are  signifying 
ones  and  which  are  not,  for  the  function  of  a code,  which  is lacking 
here,  is just  to  tell  us  what  features  to  ignore.  The  active  contem- 
plation  of  a  picture  shares  this  characteristic,  which  may  provide  us 
with another  reason  why the  metaphoric  relationship  is thought  of  as 
figurative. 
However  that  turns  out,  the  rhetorically  significant  relation  be- 
tween  metaphor  and images  lies in the  problematic  relation  they  each 
have  to  assertion.  Metaphor  needn't  provide  us with  an image,  but  it 
has an aspect-its  framing-effect-that  functions  cognitively  in a man- 
ner which is importantly  similar to that of an image.  (Though,  as men- 
tioned  earlier,  even  this  aspect  is a structured  comparison,  unlike  an 
image  per  se.)  Calling  a metaphor  a figure  is thus  a figurative  way of 
capturing  this resemblance  in functioning,  and I have tried explicating 
this  figure  here.  Neither  an  image  nor  the  framing-effect  of  a meta- 
phor  is itself  an  assertion,  and  neither  is by  itself  a proper  object  of 
belief  or  denial.  But  whole  networks  of  beliefs  are  both  involved  in 
their  composition  and are part of  what their  audiences  recognize  and 
are expected  to take away with them.  And  although  this process  takes 
place  largely  outside  the  language-game  of  assertion,  agreement,  and 
denial,  it  is  for  all  that  a  process  of  language  and  communication. 
Hence  it remains  a problem  for a theory  of  language,  whether  or not 
the theory  ends up providing  metaphors  with "meanings." 
28.  Here  I am alluding  to Goodman's  characterization  of what is special about pic- 
tures as consisting  in  their  being  part  of  a symbol  system  that  is  "syntactically  and  se- 
mantically dense."  See his Languages of Art, pp. 225-41,  esp. p. 234. 